In attempting to understand the interactions between formal and informal communities, Cynthia Kurtz and Dave Snowden’s sense-making model the Cynefin framework challenges three key assumptions currently held within organizational theory: 1) ‘Order’ – that human interactions and markets possess fundamental cause and effect relationships; 2) ‘Rational choice’ – that rational decision making based on minimizing pain or maximizing pleasure (Skinner’s ‘operant conditioning’) can be manipulated through education and thus determine possible outcomes; and 3) ‘Intent’ – that individuals or communities acquiring capabilities show an intention to use that capability. While the above assumptions may be true in some cases, Snowden’s sense-making approach contends they are not true universally, despite the fact that the methods commonly used assume that they are. Data is frequently skewed by the fact that people not only have multiple identities of which they are often blind, but they do not follow rules or act on local patterns.

Snowden, D., & Kurtz, C. F. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-Making in a complex and complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 42(3), 35-45.

In A biased history of CAAD¹ Alexander Koutamanis traces a bibliographic history of CAAD, positing that it emerges from two distinct ambitions: 1) a bottom-up technology-driven evolution of architectural computer graphics; and 2) a top-down domain of theory-minded design automation; including a subcategory of the previous two emphasizing computerization of analysis and evaluation. Results of the analysis are summarized in the above timeline, indicating parallel approaches during the broad adoption of CAAD in the 1980s, and a diversification during the democratic and populist 1990s, ranging from support, computational theory and collaborative projects with other specialisms. Algorithmic Architecture² by Kostas Terzidis shares a similar point that architectural computing is framed by two conditions: 1) bottom-up design realized through abstracted high level programming, i.e. computerization processes already conceptualized in the designer’s mind which are entered, manipulated or stored on a computer; and 2) top-down design realized through little or lower level programming, i.e. computation processes which apply scripting languages available in 3D packages like Maya Embedded Language (MEL), 3dMaxScript and FormZ 4.0.  While valid arguments can be made for all architects to have a broader understanding of computation in general, I would argue that the algorithmic approach is merely a shift towards an extreme formalist grammar. In fact on closer inspection, much of the recent work conceived using such methods has a recognizably visual bias of surface over space. In contrast to web and product design which seems more concerned with how things feel rather than look, architectural theory on the other hand remains trapped in a formalist cul-de-sac, conditioned by an increasingly formulaic geometricism. While I would agree with Terzidis that CAAD’s graphical interface incurs significant constraints on ideation (a view many design educators would share) a paradigm shift is unlikely unless a radical new way of interfacing with computer graphics is developed. Until this happens, computational architecture will remain largely faithful to its formalist roots.

1. Koutamanis, A. (2005). A biased history of CAAD. In Digital Design: The Quest for New Paradigms, 23nd eCAADe Conference Proceedings, Lisbon, September

2. Terzidis, K. (2006). Algorithmic architecture. Architectural Press

Emerging from a 1990s inquiry into the effects of emotion on cognitive health, CBU‘s Philip Barnard and John Teasdale constructed a macro-theory of mental architecture – Interacting Cognitive Subsystems¹ or ICS (above left). Accounting ‘for all the intricacies of human cognition and affect’, ICS is a highly parallel and modular structure comprising of nine interactive systems which have been further distilled into four subsystems – ‘acoustic’, ‘body state’, ‘effectors’ and ‘visual’ (above right).

In a recent series of tests into the affective qualities of images, Nick Halper et al. attempted to clarify the cognitive processing of ‘invariants’ (Gibson’s notion of stable entities) by applying ICS, making distinctions between propositional and implicational meaning – i.e. between semantic (facts about the world) and schematic (ideational and affective) content. In the experiments, participants were required to make rapid aesthetic judgements on selections of either high or low resolution images. While the earlier Fordham experiment similarly showed affective variance between cold and hot media, disseminating the effects via the ICS model potentially offers a more critical approach beyond the purely descriptive (see Gestaltism). For example – as Halper et al. explain, subsystems receive data from multiple sources but only invariants within the incoming representations become coherent. Transformations only function on coherent products and if these are absent, output becomes unusable. Transformation disengages and thus operates either on data most recently copied or from deeper within the experiential record.²

Like Fordham, Halper’s tests confirmed differences between visualization media and how they control meaning and influence judgement. Paradoxically however, while applications of ICS correctly highlight the crossmodal nature of visual perception and learning, the methods chosen to test participant feedback were largely modular (unimodal). Arguably, mapping crossmodal interaction will become an increasingly critical element for future research if such models are to be more sucessfully adopted in practice. As the most recent crossmodal studies remind us:

‘…visual processing does not appear to take place in a module independently of other sensory processes. It appears to interact vigorously with other sensory modalities in a wide variety of domains.’³

1. Philip Barnard and John Teasdale (1991) Interacting cognitive subsystems: A systematic approach to cognitive affective interaction and change. Cognition and Emotion, 5(1):1 39

2. David Duke, Philip Barnard, Nick Halper, Mara Mellin (2003) Rendering and affect. Computer Graphics Forum, 22 (3), pp. 359-368

3. Ladan Shams & Robyn Kim (2010) Crossmodal influences on visual perception. Physics of Life Reviews Vol. 7, Issue 3, pp. 269-284

‘Chaos, Trends and/or Rhythms Constituting Structures in Time’ by Franz Halberg (2001)

While recent studies by Stanford’s Martin Fischer highlight the benefits of employing 4D modeling in construction (improved communications for planning and production) the most common reasons for lack of adoption into practice is the steep learning curve, lack of analytical support and cost. Despite Fischer’s methodology ‘generating 4D models from 3d product models’ I would argue that valuable criteria remains missing from the project.

Currently, all 4D design systems are 3D platforms with procurement and scheduling plug-ins – essentially post-conceptual, thus limiting collaborative influence in the early stages of design. Without the ability to conceptualize ‘time’ as a critical dimension beyond the other 3, all environment design is fatally flawed from the earliest point of creative ideation. This is not however the fault of the architect – digital modeling platforms enforce a ‘bounded projection’ in how designers think and structure projects from a user-centred perspective. 4D models may be more easily understood by stakeholders, yet such benefits mask an critical point – buildings do not function solely as commodified entities, they must also adapt to provide stimulating and healthy environments over time to a broad range of people.

The physiological effects of ’time’ on humans has been known since the C18, with the latest studies linking chronobiological cycles to the human genome (Duboule, 2003). With the arrival of chronomic science (see Halberg‘s diagram above) and growth in evidence supporting the effects of electronic media on neurotransmitters like serotonin, noradrenaline, dopamine and tryptophan (natural psychotropics) an increasing number of researchers are now looking beyond traditional cognitive models to question the chronomic implications of media. My thesis begins with the assumption that chronomic science has the potential to counter traditional ‘closed’ systems of architectural design based on cybernetic homeostasis (the ‘superorganism’) by providing more ‘open’ tangible media frameworks instructed by biological rhythmicity.